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Abstract
Reallocation of workers from obsolete sectors to more pro…table ones is
among the most important challenges for many former centrally planned
economies on their road towards a market economy. Due to the Stalinist
mode of industrialization, this problem has an important regional dimension:
geographical mobility is required to reallocate labor from regions dominated
by industries in decline to more prosperous areas. In Russia, however, labour
market segmentation does not appear to decline. In this paper we argue that
the very existence of inherited monopsonistic or oligopsonistic local labour
market structure can obstruct workers’ ability to migrate. We analyze a
model in which …rms have an incentive to ‘attach’ their workers, that is to
restrict their ability to migrate decreasing workers’ outside option and in-
creasing rents. While the rationale for attachment is straightforward, the key
to the feasibility of attachment lies in the existence of cash constraints. We
argue that the widespread use of in-kind wages and wage arrears in Russia
may be explained as an attachment strategy of …rms: paying wages in non-
monetary forms makes it hard for workers to raise the cash needed for quit-
ting the region. There are two main results of the model. First, attachment
can only exist, if there are not too many …rms on the local labour market.
Second, attachment involves a risk of worker exploitation, i.e., the attached
workers are not compensated for their forgone option to migrate. Data of
the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) support our theory.
Controlling for personal and regional characteristics, workers’ propensity to
leave a region decreases with the degree of concentration of the local labour
market.
2
1 Introduction
Reallocation of workers from obsolete sectors to more pro…table ones is
among the most important challenges for many former centrally planned
economies on their road towards a market economy [cf. Aghion and Blan-
chard (1994)]. Due to the Stalinist mode of industrialization, this problem
has an important regional dimension. In contrast to market economies, …rms
in socialist economies did not locate according to e¢ciency considerations.
Rather, location decisions were guided by perceived or real requirements
of the military, and Stalin’s commitment to swiftly develop economically
backward regions. Many transition economies have thus inherited highly
segmented local labour markets from the past. Often, local labour markets
are dominated by one or few large …rms; large proportions of the workforce
live in regions hosting industries in decline. Unless capital moves to where
labour is, workers should have to migrate in order to correct misallocations
and to ensure labour supply for new industries with higher productivity.
However, labour market segmentation does not appear to decline, at
least not in Russia, the largest transition economy. According to data from
the Russian Ministry of Labor, the interregional di¤erentials in the ratios
between vacancies and unemployment, for instance, have increased rather
than decreased over the period 1992-95. Reallocation across regions is barely
taking place. While in Poland 12% to 26% of excess job reallocation took
place across regions, interregional reallocation in Russia only accounts for
0% to 5% in the same period of time.1 It is hence not surprising that
skilled workers have become a scarce resource in more prosperous regions,
constraining the growth potential of pro…table …rms, as a survey of Russian
industrial …rms shows: 32% of …rms have di¢culties …nding skilled blue
collar workers.2
In this paper we argue that the very existence of monopsonistic or oligop-
sonistic local labour markets can obstruct workers’ ability to migrate. Put
di¤erently: there is an important link between the inherited market struc-
1For the de…nition of excess job reallocation, and more information on labour market
segmentation, see 3.2.
2Longitudinal Survey of Russian Industrial Enterprises, referred to in Denisova et al.
(1998).
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ture of local labour markets and reallocation of labour. In Section 2, we
analyze a model in which …rms have an incentive to ‘attach’ their workers,
that is to restrict their ability to migrate. The rationale for attachment is
that ensuring that workers cannot migrate a¤ects their outside option, and
thus the rents enterprises can acquire in wage negotiations. There are two
main results of the model. First, attachment can only exist, if there are not
too many …rms in the local labour market. Second, attachment involves a
risk of worker exploitation, i.e., the welfare of attached workers is lower than
the welfare of workers who can migrate.
While the rationale for attachment is straightforward, the key to the fea-
sibility of attachment lies in a peculiarity of transition economies, namely,
the existence of cash constraints. Modern labour contracts cannot stipulate
slavery-like relationships, but cash constraints make attachment feasible.
Since migration involves transportation and search costs, and workers usu-
ally have no collateral, they must dispose of a certain amount of cash in
order to be able to migrate. By compensating workers in non-monetary
forms such as in-kind payments and fringe bene…ts, rather than cash pay-
ments, …rms can impose forced consumption on workers. If the goods and
services o¤ered are non-tradables or their transformation into cash involves
substantial transaction costs, workers will …nd it hard or impossible to save
the cash needed to …nance the costs associated with migration.
At the …rst glance one may conjecture that attachment is only feasible in
monopsonistic local labour markets, since …rms should compete in the type
of compensation they o¤er. The model, however, shows that this in general
is not the case. Rather, attachment can be sustained as a non-collusive
equilibrium outcome in an oligopsonistic market, provided the number of
…rms in the local labour market is su¢ciently small. The reason is that
…rms have a common interest of retaining workers on a local labour market.
However, beyond this number, all …rms pay cash, and attachment breaks
down, resulting in more outmigration. In a nutshell, our model shows that
attachment through non-monetary compensation can be understood as a
public good for local …rms, which breaks down due to the incentive of …rms
to free-ride on others.
In Section 3, we apply our theory to the case of Russia. We …rst establish
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two stylized facts: a) there is an increasing tendency of Russian …rms to
compensate workers in non-monetary forms such as fringe bene…ts and in-
kind payments; b) segmentation of local and regional labour markets prevails
and labour does not appear to reallocate across segmented markets. We
then investigate data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey in
order to test the main prediction of the model: Controlling for personal
and regional characteristics, workers’ propensity to leave a region should be
an increasing function of the degree of competitiveness of the local labour
market. We …nd that indeed higher labour market concentration reduces
geographical mobility, a result which appears to be robust against various
speci…cations, and of signi…cant magnitude. An increase of concentration by
one standard deviation can reduce the propensity of an individual to leave
by up to 9%.
Section 4 discusses the contribution of our theory to the literature. We
…rst look at the implications of worker attachment for our understanding of
the Russian economy, and also on the functioning of monopsonistic labour
markets in more general terms. In particular, we highlight some interesting
parallels from economic history.
2 A model of worker attachment
Our model looks at a local labour market with N …rms and one worker (W;
‘she’).3 All players are risk-neutral and maximize the sum of their payo¤s
in the …rst period and in the second period. There is no discounting. At the
beginning of the game, the worker has no savings. There is also a central
labour market, the functioning of which we blackbox. The potential wage
the worker can obtain there is common knowledge. W needs cash to migrate
to the central labour market, i.e. migration is only possible, if she received
a cash wage in the …rst period. We show that there is a cuto¤ number of
…rms in the local labour market up to which all …rms o¤er non-monetary
(attachment) contracts in the …rst period. Beyond this cuto¤, …rms o¤er
cash contract and workers migrate in the second period.
3Appendix 2 contains a discussion of the model with continuum of workers.
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Figure 1: Timing.
2.1 Timing
The timing is shown in the Fig.1.
The …rst period comprises t = f1a; 1b; 1c; 1dg, the second period t =
f2a; 2b; 2cg: All …rms are ex ante identical. The productivity of the worker
in …rm i at time t = 1; 2 is R(t)i , which is distributed over [R;R] with c.d.f
G(R). W ’s potential productivities are independent over time and across
…rms. If W is not employed by a …rm, she receives a self-employment income
s < R.
At t = 1a, W and the …rms learn the productivity of the worker in each
…rm in the …rst period. Without loss of generality, we will assume that
…rms are indexed in the descending order of their …rst-period productivity:
R
(1)
1 ¸ R(1)2 ¸ ::: ¸ R(1)N¡1 ¸ R(1)N :
At t = 1b, W and the …rms bargain over the …rst-period compensation
package which may include non-monetary components. The …rm’s bargain-
ing power is ® 2 (0; 1): The bargaining framework we consider is described
in subsection 2.3. Contracts cover only one period, that is, there is no
commitment for long-term contracts.
At t = 1c; if the worker is employed, she produces and gets her compen-
sation according to the contract signed at t = 1b.
At t = 1d; …rms decide simultaneously about whether or not to liquidate
a …xed proportion of their assets. In case a …rm decides to liquidate part
of its assets, it receives a one-shot payo¤ of L, which can be interpreted as
the revenue of selling capital in the market, or as a reduction of …xed costs.
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By the same token, the expected second-period marginal productivity of
the worker in the …rm decreases by a …xed amount °, that is the worker’s
productivity is now drawn from [R ¡ °; R ¡ °], rather than [R; R]: We will
solve for symmetric Nash equilibria allowing for mixed strategies.
At the beginning of the second period (t = 2a), all players observe W ’s
productivities in local …rms. The wage on the central labour market is
known to be wM :
At t = 2b; the worker may migrate to the central labour market pro-
vided that she holds enough cash to cover the transportation costs T , i.e.
if her …rst-period wage entailed a cash payment of at least T . In case the
worker does not migrate, …rms and worker bargain about the second-period
contract.
At t = 2c; production occurs and wages are paid.
2.2 Assumptions
A1. s < R ¡ ° < R ¡ ° < wM ¡ T < R < R : A local …rm can match the
wage on the central labour market if it does not liquidate its assets.
If the liquidation occurs, the …rm cannot compete with the wage in
the central market, but is still a better match than the local self-
employment option.
A2. s < T < R : Self-employment does not provide enough cash to move.
Local employers can pay a wage in the …rst period that provides enough
cash to move in second period.
A3. ®
£
ER ¡ (R ¡ °)¤ < L < ® [ER ¡ s] : It does not pay o¤ for local
…rms to liquidate the assets if the worker’s outside option is local self-
employment. On the other hand, …rms prefer to liquidate if there are
very many local competitors even if all of them have liquidated their
assets. Here ER =
R R
R RdG(R) is the expected marginal productivity
of the worker in a local …rm.
We are now ready to solve the model by backward induction.
7
2.3 Second-period wage determination
At t = 2b, after …rms have decided whether or not to liquidate part of their
assets, and after W ’s productivities with local …rms have been observed,
workers choose whether to stay or to migrate. If W has cash in excess of
or equal to T; and her expected wage in Moscow net of transportation costs
is higher than the local productivity, she migrates and does not engage in
bargaining with any of the local …rms. Otherwise, she bargains with the
…rms about the second-period wage.
We …rst look at the case where the worker does not have enough cash.
The worker observes her marginal productivity in each …rm R(2)i . Let us
denote jk the …rm with k-th highest second period productivity:
j1 = arg max
i
R
(2)
i ; j2 = arg max
i6=j1
R
(2)
i ; :::; jN = arg mini
R
(2)
i :
Hence, fj1; j2; ::; jNg is a permutation of f1; 2; ::;Ng such that R(2)j1 ¸ R
(2)
j2
¸
...¸ R(2)jN :
We consider the following bargaining game. The most productive …rm
makes the worker a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. In case the worker does not
accept the …rm’s o¤er, she contacts the second-most productive …rm and
receives its o¤er and so on. There is no wage-posting, i.e., …rms cannot
commit themselves to wages promised. Hence, W relies on her rational
expectation of the outcome of wage renegotiation. The worker’s bargaining
power is 1 ¡ ®. Firm j1 and the worker bargain on the division of the
joint surplus. If they do not agree, the …rm has zero payo¤ and the worker
receives w(2)j2 , the wage the worker would receive upon entering negotiations
with …rm j2. Therefore, the joint surplus is R
(2)
j1
¡ w(2)j2 . The …rm receives
®(R
(2)
j1
¡ w(2)j2 ), while W receives w
(2)
j1
= w
(2)
j2
+ (1 ¡ ®)(R(2)j2 ¡ w
(2)
j2
) =
(1 ¡ ®)R(2)j2 + ®w
(2)
j2
:
Wage wj2 is the outcome of similar bargaining between W and …rm j2.
Hence, w(2)j2 = (1 ¡ ®)R
(2)
j2
+ ®w
(2)
j3
: Carrying out N iterations, yields:
w
(2)
j1
= (1 ¡ ®)R(2)j1 + (1 ¡ ®)®R
(2)
j2
+ ::: + (1 ¡ ®)®N¡1R(2)jN + ®Ns: (1)
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W accepts the o¤er of …rm j1 and is paid w
(2)
j1
:4 The …rm gets R(2)j1 ¡
w
(2)
j1
: Obviously, the wage increases in the outside option s; in the worker’s
bargaining power 1¡ ®, and in N , the number of …rms on the local market.
An important implication of (1) is that if all …rms shrink, so that all Ri
decrease by °; the worker’s payo¤ decreases by (1 ¡ ®N )° while each …rm’s
expected rent goes down by ®N°=N .
If W has the cash required for migration, only the …rms that keep their
assets can compete for hiring the worker. Suppose that there are k such
…rms, i.e: R(2)j1 ¸ R
(2)
j2
¸ ::: ¸ R(2)jk ¸ wM ¡ T ¸ R
(2)
jk+1
:
Then the wage of the ‘non-attached’ worker is:
w(2)na (k) = (1 ¡ ®)R(2)j1 + (1 ¡ ®)®R
(2)
j2
+ ::: + (1 ¡ ®)®k¡1R(2)jk + ®k(wM ¡ T ):
(2)
If all …rms have liquidated their assets (k = 0) and W has enough cash
to move, there is no point in bargaining. W migrates, receiving a payo¤ of
wM ¡ T; while all local …rms receive nil.
2.4 Liquidation decision
We now consider the subgame that takes place at t = 1d: The decision
to keep or liquidate assets depends on the …rst-period contract. The …rst
Lemma looks at …rms’ liquidation decisions when W received enough cash
to move. (All proofs are provided in the Appendix. V Wna represents the
‘non-attached’ worker’s payo¤; V Fna the payo¤ of any …rm if the worker is
not attached.)
Lemma 1 Suppose that the worker has enough cash to migrate in the second
period. Under Assumptions A1-A3, there exists only one Nash equilibrium in
the liquidation subgame. In this equilibrium, all …rms liquidate their assets,
4Firms’ inability to credibly post their wages is very important. W ’s wage paid by the
most productive …rm j1 may be below her second highest productivity R
(2)
j2
: Therefore,
if the second best employer j2 posted a wage ~wj2 2 (w(2)j1 ; R
(2)
j2
), W would move to j2
and receive a positive surplus R(2)j2 ¡ ~wj2 : But, since there is no commitment for posted
wages, an assumption that …ts the experience in transition economies well, the wage will
be bargained down to w(2)j2 :
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and W leaves in the second period, receiving VWna (N) = w
M ¡ T; while each
…rm receives a payo¤ of V Fna(N) = L:
The intuition of this Lemma is that, if W has enough cash to migrate, the
relevant outside option is wM ¡ T , rather then s. Since the cake …rms and
W bargain about shrinks when W has an option to migrate, it is worthwhile
for the …rms to cash in L by liquidating their assets.
We now look at the branch of the game tree where W is ‘attached’
(i.e. does not have enough cash to move). We will show that for small
N , all …rms may decide to keep their assets in equilirium. To solve for the
Nash equilibrium in the liquidation subgame, we …rst need to compute the
expected second-period payo¤s of …rms and W .
Suppose that W is attached and all …rms keep their assets. Then the
second period productivities are drawn from [R; R]: The expected second-
period wage equals
w(N) = E
R
(2)
1
E
R
(2)
2
:::E
R
(2)
N
"
(1 ¡ ®)
NX
k=1
R
(2)
jk
®k¡1 + ®Ns
#
: (3)
Apparently, this function increases with N: The expected wage in case of
monopsony is w(1) = (1¡®)ER+®s; the perfectly competitive labor market
pays W the marginal product of labor w(1) = R:
At the time …rms decide whether or not to liquidate some of their assets,
they are identical in respect to their second-period productivity. Thus, each
…rm considers its expected rents, provided that it turns out to be the best
local match for W :
J(N) = ER1ER2:::ERN
"
R1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)
NX
k=1
Rjk®
k¡1 ¡ ®Ns
¯¯¯¯
¯R1 > maxi6=1 Ri
#
:
(4)
One can easily check that J(N) decreases with N . If there is only one …rm,
its expected rent is J(1) = ®(ER ¡ s) > L; but higher competition among
employers drives their rents down to zero J(1) = 0:
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Firms make liquidation decisions rationally expecting the outcome of
second-period bargaining. The following Lemma determines the liquidation
decisions in Nash equilibrium as a function of N provided W is attached.
It also states the equilibrium payo¤s of …rms V Fa (N), and the payo¤ of the
attached worker VWa (N) as a function of N:
Lemma 2 Provided W is attached, the equilibrium in the investment sub-
game is unique and can be characterized as follows. There exist N¤ < N¤¤ <
1 such that:
1. If N · N¤, all …rms keep their assets. The worker receives V Wa (N) =
w(N); while each …rm has an expected payo¤ of V Fa (N) = J(N): Here
N¤ solves J(N¤) = L:
2. If N 2 [N¤;N¤¤], …rms liquidate their assets with probability ¼(N),
which is increasing in N; ¼(N¤) = 0; ¼(N¤¤) = 1: W ’s payo¤ is
VWa (N) =
PN
n=0C
n
N (1 ¡ ¼(N))n(¼(N))N¡nw(n; N): Here CnN =
N !
n!(N¡n)! ; w(n;N) is the expected wage given that n …rms keep their
assets and N ¡ n liquidate: The …rm’s expected payo¤ is V Fa (N) =
L + (¼(N))N¡1
¡
J(N) ¡ °®N=N¢ :
3. If N ¸ N¤¤, …rms liquidate their assets with probability 1. W ’s payo¤
is VWa (N) = w(N)¡°(1¡®N): The …rm’s expected payo¤ is V Fa (N) =
L +
¡
J(N) ¡ °®N=N¢ :
The Lemma establishes that up to a cuto¤ level of N¤, it pays o¤ for
…rms not to liquidate their assets. Maintaining all assets allows them to have
a larger payo¤ provided they are the best local match. However, this payo¤
decrease in N , and beyond N¤, they randomize between maintaining and
liquidating some of their assets, which reduces their payo¤s if they happen
to be able to hire the worker, but provides them with a certain payo¤ of
L: With competition increasing even further (beyond N¤¤); …rms prefer to
liquidate with probability 1.
2.5 First-period bargaining
In the …rst period, the best match for the worker is …rm 1 (by de…nition,
R
(1)
1 ¸ R(1)2 ¸ ::: ¸ R(1)N > s). W bargains with …rm 1 about level and
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composition of her compensation fm(1)1 ; x(1)1 g; m(1)1 + x(1)1 = w(1)1 : If the
parties agree on an attachment contract with a monetary part m(1)1 < T ,
the …rm receives R(1)1 ¡w(1)1 +V Fa (N) and the worker receives w(1)1 +VWa (N).
If the contract provides the worker with enough cash to move m(1)1 > T;
then the …rm gets R(1)1 ¡w(1)1 +V Fna(N) and the worker gets w1+V Wna (N) =
w
(1)
1 + w
M ¡ T: Therefore attachment maximizes the joint surplus if and
only if
V Fa (N) ¡ V Fna(N) ¸ wM ¡ T ¡ VWa (N): (5)
Condition (5) holds for all …rms, since they are ex ante identical with regard
to the second period. Therefore, the worker will expect the same type of
compensation in all …rms, whether they are more or less productive in the
…rst period. Indeed, suppose that (5) holds and …rm 1 o¤ers in-kind contract
but …rm 2 promises wage in cash. If w(1)1 ¡ w(1)2 is less than the value of the
option to leave in the second period (the right hand side of (5)), then the
worker would prefer …rm 2: The problem is that the …rm 2 cannot commit
to pay wage in cash. Once the worker left 1; …rm 2 will renegotiate the
contract: since (5) holds, attachment maximizes joint surplus. Therefore
either (5) holds and all …rms pay in kind or (5) does not hold and all …rms
pay in cash.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium in the game with N local employers is as
follows.
1. W is hired in the …rst period by the employer with the highest produc-
tivity.
2. Attachment occurs in equilibrium if and only if condition (5) holds.
Corollary 1 If N ¸ N¤¤; there is no attachment in equilibrium:
Corollary 2 If
wM ¡ T ¡ w(N¤) > 0 (6)
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then attachment occurs in equilibrium if and only if N < N¤ and
J(N) ¡ L ¸ wM ¡ T ¡ w(N): (7)
Corollary 3 If (6) does not hold then there exists such N 2 (N¤;N¤¤) that
attachment occurs in equilibrium whenever N · N:
The Proposition implies that competition in the local labor market makes
the attachment less likely to happen. The …rst corollary states that attach-
ment is only feasible at N < N¤¤:
The other two corollaries describe two di¤erent rationales for attachment.
If condition (6) holds, attachment takes away the worker’s option to leave
in the second period. The option has a positive value, therefore the worker
would prefer a lower cash wage in the …rst period to a higher non-monetary
compensation. For attachment to happen, the …rm’s bene…t of attaching
the worker (the left-hand side in (7)) must be greater than the value of the
option to go that the worker sacri…ces by accepting the attachment contract
(the right-hand side in (7)).
The second case where (6) does not hold, shows that attachment can oc-
cur even if …rms liquidate with a positive probability. In the mixed strategy
equilibrium, …rm are indi¤erent between keeping their assets and liquidat-
ing. On the other hand, the worker prefers lower probability of liquidation
since her wage is higher if the …rm keeps its assets. In this case the worker
also bene…ts from the attachment and does not need a compensation for
accepting in-kind payments.
At N = 1; (7) becomes L <
£
ER ¡ (wM ¡ T )¤. The attachment can
therefore occur for a broad range of parameter values that satisfy A1-A3.
E.g. take s = 0; ® = 0:3; ° = 2; L = 0:2; wM ¡ T = 3:9; R = 4; R = 5;
G(R) = R¡4 (uniform distribution). Then N¤ 2 (2; 3); N¤¤ 2 (3; 4); attach-
ment occurs at N < 3; i.e. both in case of monopsony and duopsony; while
if there are three or more employers, cash contracts prevail in equilibrium,
and the worker leaves the region.
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2.6 Discussion of results
The key to the main result — feasibility of attachment hinges on the number
of …rms on a local labour market — lies in the impact the worker’s second-
period cash holding has on …rms’ liquidation decisions. Liquidation involves
the following tradeo¤: On one hand, it yields a certain payo¤, but on the
other hand, it reduces the expected productivity of the worker, i.e., it makes
the surplus, the …rm and the worker bargain about, shrink. The second
determinant of the surplus’ size is the worker’s outside option. If the worker
has some cash, the relevant outside option is to migrate to the central labour
market providing (net of the migration costs) a higher utility then the local
self-employment option. A1-A3 state that if migration is the relevant outside
option, the part of the surplus that the …rm can acquire in wage bargaining
is not large enough to cover the revenue that the …rm can cash in when
liquidating the assets.
The choice of …rms which type of contract to o¤er in the …rst period is
based on the following tradeo¤. An attachment contract involves that each
…rm has an equal chance of 1=N to hire the worker in the second period and
to cash in some rents. A cash contract, on the other hand, may be cheaper,
because the worker has a preference for cash, since only cash allows her to
migrate in the second period. We have shown that the expected second-
period rent of each (ex ante identical) …rm decreases in N : …rst, since the
probability to hire the worker in the future decreases; second, because the
expected rent, contingent on hiring the worker depends negatively on N .
If competition is high, the expected rents are not su¢ciently large to com-
pensate for the discount the …rm receives when o¤ering cash. Consequently,
beyond a certain level of competition, …rms always o¤er cash contracts.
It is important to notice that attachment may involve exploitation, i.e.,
attached workers forgo the bene…ts of migration without being compensated
for it. Consider the case where (6) holds. Comparing the worker’s payo¤
in the attachment equilibrium with the payo¤ she would get in the absence
of cash constraints makes this point clear. Assume for a moment that the
worker can borrow against her future wages in the central labor market.
Then in the second period the worker will have an outside option of wM¡T ;
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local …rms will liquidate, and the worker will indeed leave the local labour
market. Her two period payo¤ will therefore be w1 + wM ¡ T: On the other
hand in the presence of the cash constraints, the worker only gets w1+w(N):
Since w(N) < w(N¤) < wM ¡ T; attachment actually reduces the worker’s
welfare. Why does competition between …rms not prevent exploitation?
Apparently, expecting that the …rm 1 o¤ers an in-kind contract, …rm 2
would promise a cash contract in order to be able to hire the worker. But
the worker would rationally expect that the promised cash wage will be
renegotiated to non-monetary compensation: if condition (7) holds for …rm
1, it also holds for …rm 2. Firm 2 will also know that …rm 3 will not be able
to hire the worker by promising cash since …rm 3 will also prefer attachment
in equilibrium. Since the self-employment income s is too low to save for
moving, in the attachment equilibrium the worker is not compensated for
her outside option.
One way to prevent exploitation is to raise the bargaining power of the
worker (e.g. through unions). An increase in 1¡® results in a higher w(N),
hence (6) is less likely to hold. If bargaining power of the worker is high
enough, the attachment may still occur but would not involve exploitation.
3 The Russian labour market
In this subsection, we discuss two constituting elements of the Russian
labour market, which our theory reconciles. First, we present some facts
on the widespread use of non-monetary compensation in modern Russia.
Second, we look at the lacking interregional mobility and the resulting per-
petuated labour market segmentation. Third, we present results of empirical
analysis of the RLMS data.
3.1 Non-monetary compensation
In the Soviet Union, …rms provided a wide range of non-monetary bene…ts to
their workers, including hospitals, housing, rest houses, child care, catering
and education. Cash wages being subject to rigid regulations, the quantity
and quality of fringe bene…ts was an important instrument to attract work-
ers. The magnitude of these fringe bene…ts was substantial. Commander
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and Jackman (1997) …nd in a 1992 survey among Russian …rms that social
bene…t provision accounted for 35% of total labour costs.
A number of presidential decrees stipulated that all assets related to pro-
vision of such services had to be transferred to municipalities, but in general,
…rms have not discontinued the provision of social services. In particular in
local labour markets in which few …rms control most of the employment,
…rms own up to 85% of the social assets [Healey et al. (1998)]. Tratch et
al. (1996) report in a survey of 93 enterprises that from 1991 to 1995, 65%
of enterprise-owned kindergartens were closed down, while 80% or more of
other establishments (such as hospitals, restaurants) were preserved. More-
over, …rms even established new types of facilities or transformed existing
ones. According to the Russian Labor Flexibility Survey [Standing (1997)],
37% of the …rms provided company rest houses, 42% health services, 29%
child care, and 35% subsidized catering. Commander and Schankermann
(1997) report similar …gures, while the …gures of another survey [VCIOM
(1997)] are substantially higher.
A more recent survey of 200 enterprises by Biletsky et. al. (1999)5
shows that the provision of services has only slightly decreased. The …rst
table shows that sharp drops only occured in construction of new housing
and concerning kindergarten services. The second table, presenting the per-
centage of …rm employing workers in activities related to the provision of
goods and services corroborates the impression.
Biletsky et al.’s survey also shows that in-kind substitutes for wages are
on the rise. In 1991, 3% of the …rms provided in-kind payments, in 1994
it was already 10% of the …rms, and the …gure increased to 27% by 1998.
During the same period of time, the share of the wage bill paid in kind in
the respective …rms was rather constant around 30% (between 26% and 37%
over time).
We believe that the provision of fringe bene…ts and in-kind payments is
not due to behavioural inertia of paternalistic managers, but rather follows
the strategic patterns we have highlighted in our model. A survey [VCIOM
(1997)] among top managers and executives of 142 enterprises con…rms this
5We are grateful to David Brown and John Earle for providing us with data from their
survey.
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1990 1994 1998
Catering 55 50 41
Medical services 64 63 56
Vacation facilities 62 56 44
Professional training 78 71 59
New housing 45 34 18
Kindergarten services 66 54 32
Table 1: Percentage of …rms providing di¤erent types of fringe bene…ts,
Biletsky et al (1999).
1990 1994 1998
Catering 35 49 50
Medical services 30 33 32
Vacation facilities 34 36 30
Professional training n.a. n.a. n.a.
New housing 35 42 34
Kindergarten services 46 41 20
Table 2: Percentage of …rms employing workers in non-core activities, Bilet-
sky et. al. (1999).
17
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Bulgaria — — 0.30 0.02 0.01
Poland — 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.26
Romania — — 0.08 0.22 0.01
Slovenia — 0.17 0.18 0.29 0.01
Estonia — 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.27
Russia 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00
Table 3: Fraction of excess job reallocation resulting from employment shifts
between regions. Source: Faggio and Konings (1999).
view: only 37% of the respondents continued to run the social assets of their
…rm because of ‘soviet traditions’, while 51% responded that social assets
were used in order to keep or attract new workers.
3.2 Labour market segmentation and the lack of interre-
gional mobility
As a consequence of soviet-style industrialization, the Russian labour market
was, at the outset of transition, highly segmented. Employment on local
labour markets was often concentrated in one or very few large plants. With
Russia entering economic transition, a productivity and income gap emerged
between Moscow, St Petersburg, and some of the western regions on one
hand, and the Far North, the southern and eastern periphery (the so-called
‘Red Belt’) on the other hand (see Berkovitz and DeJong (1999)). One
would thus expect massive reallocation of workers across regions.6 However,
as the Table 3 shows, this is not the case.7
The high degree of labour market segmentation can also be seen from the
regional variation in job opportunities, measured in the ratio of unemployed
6Heleniak (1999) estimates the potential for migration from Russian North at 2 mln.
people.
7The table reports the share of excess job reallocation that occurs across regions in
total excess job reallocation. Excess job reallocation equals the di¤erence between job
turnover and net job ‡ows. We are grateful to Jozef Konings for providing us with the
…gures for Russia which are calculated on the basis of the Russian Enterprise Registry
Longitudinal Dataset.
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Bryansk oblast 58 158 58 62 84
Vladimir oblast 18 28 34 46 38
Moscow City 4 3 3 2 1
Ryazan oblast 24 28 48 42 48
Tula oblast 6 15 18 31 32
Table 4: Ratio of unemployed over vacancies in the Central economic region,
Goskomstat, own calculations.
over vacancies. We use Goskomstat data, and look at this indicator on two
levels. First, on the level of the ‘economic regions’, the ratio for the Central
Region was roughly 8 in 1993, increasing to 13 in 1996, but dropped to its
initial level in 1997. Looking at the same index for the Eastern Siberian
Region, we …nd that the ratio grew steadily from 18 in 1993 to 76 in 1997.
It is not too surprising that reallocation of labour is di¢cult across the huge
economic regions, some of which are larger then the largest Western Euro-
pean countries. However, it is striking that the unemployed-over-vacancies
ratios within economic regions vary to a comparable extent. The next table
presents the respective …gures for four administrative regions, and the City
of Moscow, all of which belong to the Central Region, the most developed
and densely populated economic region.
One may wonder why workers from say Ryazan, a town situated two
hundred kilometers away from Moscow, are not moving to the capital? The
most obvious answer to this question is: because migration may not be
worth the costs.
To look at this argument, we have tried to estimate the costs and bene…ts
of internal migration. Monthly salaries in Roubles were collected from 28
Russian towns and cities for up to ten occupations as well as rents and
transportation prices. The source of this information are job advertisements
in newspapers in October 2000. The full list is available on request; we here
only report the data for Moscow and Ryazan, since we believe that the
di¢culties associated with migration increasing in the distance.
The last column presents the di¤erences in monthly income de‡ated by
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Ryazan Moscow
Moscow,
de‡ated
Di¤erence,
Ryazan rubles
Policeman 500-1200 2400-2600 1807-1958 607-1458
Secur. guard 700-1500 2900-3400 2184-2560 684-1860
Car mechanic 1500-2300 5000 3765-3765 1465-2265
Painter 1000-1500 5400-6000 4066-4518 2566-3518
Accountant 1100-1250 4200-6000 3163-4518 1913-3418
Driver 1500-2000 4150-5800 3125-4367 1125-2867
Foreman 2000-4000 8300-10000 6250-7530 2250-5530
Table 5: Salary di¤erentials between Moscow and Ryzan, October 2000.
Reported are monthly salaries in current rubles. The exchange rate was 28
rubles/USD. O¢cial statistics estimate consumer prices to be 32.8 per cent
higher in Moscow than in Ryazan: the minimum living standard (calculated
as the cost of 25 goods basket) is 664 rubles in Ryazan and 882 rubles in
Moscow.
the regional CPI. The costs of moving consists of …rst, di¤erences in rents.
The monthly rent for a one room ‡at (bottom range) is 900 rubles in Ryazan,
compared to 2000-3000 Roubles in Moscow. Moreover, a Moscow City pass-
port (‘registration’), is needed; a temporary registration costs approximately
2000 rubles for half a year. The …xed cost of moving that includes train ticket
and shipment of furniture is another 2000 rubles. Provided that a worker
migrating to Moscow …nds a job immediately, he or she would be able to
break even within couple of months. However, the opportunity costs asso-
ciated with searching a job must also be taken into account. Assuming a
6 months search-period, a painter would break even after one and a half
year (6 months of searching plus one year of earning a real wage three times
higher than in Ryazan). Thus it appears that there is scope for migration,
but the associated costs must be paid upfront requiring a substantial amount
of cash for migration (the …xed costs of moving plus the cost of paying high
rent during the search period).
The second potential explanation for low interregional migration may
be due to lacking ‡exibility of Russian workers, i.e. excessively high costs
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of adapting to new environments. The evidence contradicts this argument.
Turnover rates in Russia are high, in the same range as the ones in Poland,
and much higher then in Bulgaria and Romania for instance, but churning
is almost exclusively local [Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1999)]. As Kapeliush-
nikov (1999) notices, workers are very ‡exible but they change ’bad’ jobs for
’bad’ jobs (this is also consistent with evidence in Smirnych and Wörgötter
(1999) who show that changing jobs does not give Russian workers a better
wage).
3.3 Empirics
To our knowledge, there is no dataset that would allow a direct test of our
model. However, the ‘Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey’ (RLMS), a
representative data set on Russian households, contains some information
that is useful for an analysis of the impact of local labour market concen-
tration on individual moving decisions. While due to data quality, some
caveats apply, the evidence we …nd appears in line with our theory.
3.3.1 Data
The RLMS is not a panel data set.8 However, interviews in Round VI
(winter 1995/96) and Round VII (winter 1996/97) were conducted in the
same dwellings. In case surveyed persons had moved, interviewers were
supposed to …nd out about their new residence, provided they had not left
the community.9 This allows to construct an, albeit imperfect, variable
capturing geographical mobility.
We only consider individuals aged between 16 and 60 who had a job
in Round VI. We are interested in the relationship between the dependent
variable ‘Move’, and the independent variable ‘CR4 ’. Move takes a value
of nil if an individual interviewed in Round VI happened to live in the
same community in Round VII. The variable takes a value of one, if the
interviewers were not able to …nd an individual in the same community he
8For more information on the RLMS, see: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms.
9The RLMS is supposed to be representative at the national level. The interviews
have been conducted in 38 communities. Persons who left their community have not been
followed up.
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or she dwelled in during Round VI. Unfortunately, Move = 1 also entails
non-respondents, and people who deceded between Rounds VI and VII.
Thus, Move represents an imperfect measure for regional mobility.10
CR4 represents the percentage of the labor force employed by the largest
four employers on the respective local labour market. In constructing this
variable, we have considered all large and medium-sized …rms submitting
statistics to Goskomstat, the Federal Committee of Statistics of the Russian
Federation.
We also use a host of control variables from the RLMS: personal char-
acteristics, like age, gender, education, whether or not individuals had sec-
ondary jobs; primary job characteristics, e.g., wages and wage arrears, in-
kind payments, job tenure, number of subordinates; household characteris-
tics, e.g. size and structure of the household, total income of the household,
apartment ownership. We also used proxies for the subjective well-being of
individuals, like the self-assessed economic rank, satisfaction with life, in-
tention to change job or to move away from a community. Moreover, we
use information about the economy of the so-called 38 ‘Primary Sampling
Units’ (PSUs), the communities where people were surveyed. We have de-
‡ated all nominal variables by a local CPI that uses price information of 25
basic goods from the RLMS, and weighs them according to the Goskomstat
methodology. Appendix 3 lists all the variables we have looked at.
3.3.2 Main Results
Table A (Appendix 3) presents the results of di¤erent probit speci…cations
for Move. While we have run regressions with all potentially interesting
personal, household and job characteristics, we present only those variables
that are jointly signi…cant. Table B presents their descriptive statistics. To
make the results of regressions easily interpretable, we report the marginal
e¤ect of a change in the respective independent variable on an individual’s
likelihood to move (computed at the average value of the respective variable).
The …rst speci…cation includes 38 dummies for the PSUs and provides a
10According to Goskomstat, the mortality rate in Russia was roughly 1.5% in 1995.
Thus we believe that the sample distortion due to non-respondents is more substantial
than the one due to mortality.
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useful benchmark. Since PSUs and CR4 are perfectly correlated, we cannot
include both in the same regression. In spec. 2, we thus replace the PSU
dummies with the respective CR4, and control for the eight large, economic
regions that are roughly equivalent to the de…nition of the super-regions,
the ‘Presidential Districts’, including a special dummy for Moscow.
Comparing spec. 1 and spec. 2, we note that the explanatory power
decreases without PSUs, but signs, magnitudes and statistical signi…cance
of the coe¢cients in the two speci…cations do not di¤er much. The positive
sign of monthly household income (the …rst variable), de‡ated by the local
CPI, is in line with our theory that highlights the importance of liquidity
constraints on moving decisions.11 People with longer tenure in the …rm
tend to be less mobile, a fact that can be reconciled with the presence of
relation-speci…c human capital. Education, measured in years, in‡uences
moving decisions positively. Older and married persons tend to move with
lower probability, while men have a higher propensity to move. The dummy
indicating whether an individual lives in a rented ‡at exerts strong positive
in‡uence on the moving decision. This can be interpreted as a sign that
people who move more often prefer to live in rented ‡ats, rather then in
their own ‡ats (or company dormitories). However, the fact of renting an
apartment is also a potential proxy for the cash individuals hold, since in
Russia, ‡ats rented on the market are usually of higher quality and more
expensive. As expected, having children in the age between 7 and 18 has
a negative impact on moving decisions. Any other household variable does
not a¤ect the decision to move.
The major lesson from spec. 2 is that as predicted by our theory, higher
labour market concentration as measured by CR4 has a negative impact on
11We have also run regressions with monthly salary rather than household income and
found the coe¢cient to be positive and signi…cant as well. Since controlling for personal
and job characteristics, one should expect that individuals with higher income should be
less interested in leaving, the positive sign suggests that the liquidity e¤ect of a higher
income dominates. It is also interesting that the coe¢cient is larger for low-income in-
dividuals than for higher incomes. We report regressions with household income rather
then individual salaries since we believe the latter to be a better measure of liquidity, and
many of the salary observations are missing. While it would have been preferable to look
at the stock of household savings, such information is not available in the RLMS.
23
individuals’ moving decisions, the magnitude of which is substantial: when
CR4 increases by one standard deviation (.29), an individuals probability to
move decreases by 4 percent points. Given that in our sample, only 18% of
the surveyed individuals happen to have Move = 1, we believe this impact
to be important.
3.3.3 Alternative explanations, additional evidence
One could argue that …rm-speci…c factors may a¤ect geographical mobil-
ity in a non-strategic way, and that they may be correlated with local
concentration indices. In concentrated local markets, …rms may be more
sensitive to shocks and liquidity constraints may force them to pay wages
in non-monetary forms. In order to control properly for this explanation,
one would want to look at matched …rm-individual data allowing to verify
whether cash-constrained …rms have a larger propensity to compensate their
workers in a non-monetary way. However, with the available data, we can
only control for liquidity on a more aggregated level. We have looked at
three variables: …rst, the ratio of per capita monetary income de‡ated by
the minimum living standard in the region (oblast); second, the per-capita
deposits in the regional ‘Sberbanks’ (the savings and loans banks), de‡ated
in a similar way; third, the average shares of barter in local …rms’ sales.
Spec. 3 reports the results for the …rst of these variables, which happens to
provide the best …t.12 Clearly, the coe¢cients for CR4 remain negative and
signi…cant.13
Another alternative explanation for the observed negative empirical rela-
tionship between labour market concentration and mobility goes as follows.
For the sake of the argument, let us assume that higher rates of labour
market concentration are correlated with higher product market concentra-
tion. Then, when CR4 is high, there are more rents that can be shared
12The e¤ect of the second variable is similar. The e¤ect of the third one is insigni…cant,
which may be due to the fact that the barter survey only included a few hundred …rms
an is thus not regionally representative.
13One should however be careful to overinterpret this result, since CR4 is negatively
correlated with the …rst two demonetization indices. A regression we have run shows that
they jointly explain roughly 23% of the variation of CR4. (All non-reported regressions
are available on request.)
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between managers and workers, which ceteris paribus makes current em-
ployment more attractive. In order to control for this explanation, we have
regressed wages on CR4 and relevant controls.14 We have found that the
e¤ect of CR4 on salaries is negative, signi…cant and quite large: in di¤erent
speci…cations, individual wage decreases by .4 to .5% when CR4 increases
by 1%, indicating that this explanation can be rejected.
The third explanation builds on potential economies of scale in the pro-
vision of fringe bene…ts like hospitals, housing, schools etc. Then, a higher
CR4 would be an indicator for better provision of fringe bene…ts that more
then compensate potentially lower monetary wages. Looking at in‡ows into
local labour markets, one could, in principle, test this theory. While our
theory predicts both low out‡ows and low in‡ows from concentrated lo-
cal labour markets, the above explanation would predict low out‡ows and
high in‡ows. Unfortunately, we have not been able to identify population
changes on the local level. However, anecdotal evidence seems to suggest
that workers are not very keen to move into local labour markets with high
concentration, but that there are many people who would like to leave, but
do not have the …nancial means to do so.15
Since CR4 may be correlated with many characteristics of the PSU’s
local economy, we have looked at the e¤ect of living standard proxies that
are uncorrelated with CR4. In spec. 4, the additional independent variables
are …rst, the availability of bank services; second, the quality of telecom-
munication services; and third, the quality or roads in the PSUs. While
these variables matter, they reduce magnitude and signi…cance of CR4 only
marginally.
As noted before, observing Move = 1, we cannot distinguish non-respon-
dents from persons who moved out from the community. However, one can
use the fact that in Round VI, subjects were asked whether they intended
14Regression results are available on request.
15 In a survey of students, disabled, unemployed and retired individuals residing in
Russian North, 54 to 68% (for various categories) responded that they would be will-
ing to leave the region but only 3-11% said that they would have su¢cient …nancial means
to cover the migration costs fully or partially (Heleniak (1999)). While the surveyed cat-
egories are apparently the most cash constrained ones, the magnitude of the problem is
striking.
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to move in the course of the following 12 months. It turns out that an
individual’s intention to move in Round VI is a good predictor for having
Move = 1 in Round VII. The respective probability is 42% for those who
intended to move vs 15% for the rest of the sample. We have thus, for
spec. 5 (Table A), removed individuals from the sample who did not intend
to move, but had Move = 1 in Round VI, since we believe them to be
more likely non-respondents. The respective regression attributes a lower
magnitude to CR4, but it remains signi…cant, and the explanatory power
more then doubles, compared to spec. 4.16 Finally, we would like to respond
to yet another potential alternative explanation arguing that non-monetary
compensation, and thus attachment, may depend on personal characteristics
rather then on the outcome of strategic interaction between …rms. While we
do not have any information about fringe bene…ts, which represent the bulk
of non-monetary compensation, the RLMS contains a dummy for in-kind
payments in the month preceding the interview date. Table C shows the
results of a probit regression where the dependent variable is the dummy
for in-kind payments, and the independent variables are those that we have
used in the preceding regressions. Again, CR4 turns out to be signi…cant,
while most of the other variables have insigni…cant or very weak e¤ects.
4 Concluding remarks
We have argued that …rms may not only have an incentive to restrict the
mobility of workers, but also the means to do so. Though the model has been
inspired by modern Russia, we believe that it has features that are of a more
general interest. Two conditions must be satis…ed in order for attachment to
be feasible. First, workers must be cash-constrained; second, labour markets
must be concentrated. These conditions are satis…ed in some transition
economies, but there are also other cases, in particular from economic history
that provide interesting parallels. In what follows we discuss what our theory
16We have also run a regression on the subsample of individuals who intended to move
in Round VI (Table A, spec.6). In this subsample the coe¢cient for CR4 happens to be
signi…cant and very large (.29), but we would not want to overinterpret the result, since
the sample size shrinks to 292 individuals.
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contributes to our understanding of the Russian labour market, the Russian
economy in more general terms, and the functioning of unregulated labour
markets.
To our knowledge, our analysis of non-monetary compensation as a
strategic tool for …rms to reduce the mobility of workers, is novel. There is a
related literature that looks at labour relations in Russia. Commander and
Schankermann (1997) argue that the absence of a social security network re-
duces workers’ mobility, since they fear exclusion from …rm-provided social
services as a consequence. Their argument applies however only for mobility
in the same labour market, and presumes that …rms are worker-controlled
and not willing to sell their services to outsiders. Grosfeld et al. (1999) re-
late the segmentation of the Russian labor market to the provision of fringe
bene…ts. However, they rather look at segmentation according to skills, and
do not consider the strategic interaction between …rms and its impact on
migration. Earle and Sabirianova’s (1998) analysis of wage arrears looks at
the strategic interaction between …rms, but does not consider the impact of
wage arrears on the ability to migrate.
In more general terms, our theory contributes to some important issues
of the Russian economy. In as much as we highlight the risk of worker
exploitation in concentrated labour markets, our model complements Er-
icson’s (1999) concept of the Russian economy as a ’post-soviet industrial
feudalism’, in which …rms seek to make their workers dependent on the man-
agement. Second, it has been argued that the Russian economy su¤ers from
of ’internal borders’ that are erected by regional governments pursuing their
particular political interests [Berkovitz and de Jong (1999)]. As our model
shows, labour mobility may be subject to similar internal borders, constrain-
ing the capacity of the Russian economy to grow, since labour reallocation
is hampered. Finally, the Russian government has identi…ed regional disin-
tegration as one of the major culprits of economic weakness. Blanchard and
Shleifer (2000) have accordingly argued that the disappointing transition
experience of Russia in comparison to China may be due to weak central
institutions who fail to obstruct rent-seeking behaviour of regional and local
governments. One might argue that recentralisation would not be a neces-
sity if workers could ’vote with their feet’. However, as our model shows,
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the availability of the cash required for quitting the region is subject to the
labour market structure inherited from the past.
There are many interesting parallels between the strategies used by
Russian …rms today, and institutions that have emerged throughout eco-
nomic history. Alston and Ferrie’s (1993) paper on paternalism in the former
confederate states of the USA after the Civil War is an interesting case in
point. Attachment also appears to have played an important role in the the
‘truck system’ in the UK, particularly relevant in the 19th century. Hilton
(1960) provides interesting evidence about this system, in which the con-
sumption of some goods is somehow tied to the employment contract. One
of the prevailing contemperaneous explanations of the truck system was that
…rms attempted to restrict their hirelings’ mobility through the debt that
they would accumulate vis-à-vis company stores.
Finally, there is also a body of literature that looks at the functioning of
labour markets when …rms enjoy market power. Here, it has been asked what
can protect workers from being exploited in the absence of regulation (cf. the
surveys of Boal and Ransom (1997) and Fishback (1998)). Besides ’voice’,
i.e. organized labour, the literature identi…es two forces — ’exit’ (migration)
and competition. Our theory points out the relationship between these
forces: the availabilty of the exit option is contingent on having the cash
needed for migration, which, in turn, depends on competition. Thus, if
workers are cash constrained and local labour markets are oligopsonistic, the
organization of the workforce may be the only safeguard against exploitation.
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5 Appendices
5.1 Appendix 1. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Let us prove that the …rm is always better-o¤ liqui-
dating rather than keeping its assets.
Consider …rm 1’s decision if K¡1 other …rms choose to keep their assets.
If …rm 1 liquidates the assets, it gets only L: If …rm 1 keeps the assets, it
gets
ER1ER2 :::ERK
"
R1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)
KX
k=1
Rjk®
k¡1 ¡ ®K(wM ¡ t)
¯¯¯¯
¯ R1 > maxk=2;:::;KRk
#
:
(8)
This function decreases with K, therefore the bene…t of keeping the
assets is below its value at K = 1; i.e. ®(ER¡(wM¡T )) < ®(ER¡(R¡°)) <
L (see A1,A3).
Proof of Lemma 2. Let us …nd the optimal strategy of …rm 1 given
that all other …rms keep their assets. If …rm 1 keeps its assets, its expected
second period payo¤ is J(N). If …rm 1 liquidates its assets, its expected
second period payo¤ is 0. On the other hand, it gets the liquidation value of
L. Therefore the …rm will choose to keep its assets if and only if J(N) ¸ L:
Therefore the equilibrium where all …rms choose to keep the assets is only
sustainable if J(N) ¸ L = J(N¤): On can easily check that J(N) is a
decreasing function of N (see (4)). Therefore J(N) ¸ L is equivalent to
N · N¤:
To prove the second statement, let us just notice that in the fully mixed
strategy equilibria 0 < ¼(N) < 1, the …rms are indi¤erent between keeping
or liquidating the assets. Therefore their payo¤ can be calculated as their
payo¤ in case they liquidate which is L + ¼N¡1(N)
¡
J(N) ¡ ®N°=N¢ : The
probability ¼(N) is such that each …rm is indi¤erent whether to keep or
liquidate given that other …rms liquidate with probability ¼(N):
The …rm 1’s returns to keeping the assets increase with probability of
other …rms liquidating and decrease with number of competitors N ¡ 1.
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Since in all fully mixed equilibria …rms’ returns to keeping the assets are
exactly 0, ¼(N) must be an increasing function.
Suppose that all other …rms liquidate with probability one. Then if the
…rm also liquidates, it gets L +
¡
J(N) ¡ ®N°=N¢ : If it keeps the assets, it
gets the worker with probability 1. The wage equals
(1 ¡ ®)ER + (1 ¡ ®)®ER1 ::ERN¡1
N¡1X
k=1
®k¡1(R(2)jk ¡ °) + ®Ns =
= (1 ¡ ®)ER + ® £w(N ¡ 1) ¡ °(1 ¡ ®N¡1)¤ :
The …rm therefore obtains the rent ®
£
ER ¡ w(N ¡ 1) + °(1 ¡ ®N¡1)¤ : It
prefers to liquidate the assets whenever L + J(N) ¸ ®[ER ¡ w(N ¡ 1) +
°(1 ¡ N¡1N ®N )]: According to A3, this inequality holds for large N: Indeed,
at N = 1 it becomes L ¸ ® £ER ¡ R + °¤ : Therefore there exists such N¤¤
that for all N ¸ N¤¤ all …rms liquidate their assets.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that (5) holds. Then it is common
knowledge that if the worker goes to …rm N , she will be o¤ered an attach-
ment contract: the joint surplus in case of attachment is V Fa (N)+V
W
a (N)+
R
(1)
N ¡s is greater than one in case of cash contract V Fna(N)+wM¡T+R(1)N ¡s;
the worker’s outside option is s which is not su¢cient for breaking the at-
tachment. Similarly, if the worker goes to …rm N ¡ 1; both will know that
the worker’s outside option is w(1)N = s+(1¡®)(V Fa (N)+V Wa (N)+R(1)N ¡s)
paid in kind : Since (5) holds, the joint surplus of …rm N ¡1 and the worker
is greater in case of attachment and …rm N ¡ 1 should also o¤er an in-kind
contract. Making another N ¡ 2 iterations, we obtain that …rm 1 will o¤er
an attachment contract. Hence the worker will be attached in equilibrium.
Similarly, if (5) does not hold, every …rm will o¤er cash contract.
5.2 Appendix 2. Sketch of a model with a continuum of
workers
Consider a version of the model above where instead of one worker we have
a continuum of workers with total mass normalized to 1. The wage deter-
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mination and assumptions are all the same. The only di¤erence is that in
each period, …rms bargain with workers separately. All workers are identi-
cal, their productivities are uncorrelated. (In a symmetric equilibrium, all
…rms end up hiring the same number of workers.)
5.2.1 Liquidation game with a continuum of workers
When the …rms take liquidation decisions they already know how many
workers are able to leave the region. Denote » 2 [0; 1] the share of attached
workers.
Lemma 3 If » workers are attached, the equilibrium in the liquidation char-
acterized as follows.
1. If N · N¤ and » 2 [»¤(N); 1] all …rms keep their assets. Here
»¤(N) = 1 ¡ J(N) ¡ L
(wM ¡ T ¡ s)®N=N (9)
The attached workers get V Wa (N) = w(N); the non-attached workers
get V Wna (N) = w(N) + (w
M ¡ T ¡ s)®N : Each …rm gets V F» (N) =
J(N) ¡ (1 ¡ »)(wM ¡ T ¡ s)®N=N:
2. There exists such »¤¤(N) · minf»¤(N); 1g that if » 2 [»¤¤(N); »¤(N)];
then …rms liquidate their assets with probability ¼(»;N), which is in-
creasing in N and decreasing in »: The …rm’s expected payo¤ is V F» (N) =
L+¼N¡1(N)(J(N)¡®N°=N): The function »¤¤(N) increases with N;
and »¤¤(N¤¤) = 1:
3. If » · »¤¤(N); …rms liquidate their assets with probability 1. The at-
tached workers get VWa (N) = w(N)¡°(1¡®N); the non-attached work-
ers get VWna (N) = w
M¡T: Each …rm gets V F» (N) = (1¡»)
¡
J(N) ¡ °®N=N¢ :
5.2.2 Attachment with continuum of workers
In the …rst period, a worker of mass d! bargain with a …rm i1 (the best
match for the worker in the …rst period) about the level of compensation
wi1 and composition of compensation fmi1 ; xi1g; mi1 + xi1 = wi1 : If the
parties agree on a contract with a monetary part mi1 < T , the …rm gets
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(R
(1)
i1
¡ wi1)d! + V F»+d!(N) and the worker gets (wi1 + V Wa (N))d! where »
is the share of the attached workers to be determined from the equilibrium
conditions. We will refer to such a contract as an ‘attachment contract’. If
the contract provides the worker with enough cash to move mi1 > T; then
the …rm gets (R(1)i1 ¡wi1)d!+V F» (N) and the worker gets (wi1 +V F» (N))d!:
Therefore attachment maximizes the joint surplus if and only if
@V F» =@» ¸ VWna (N) ¡ V Wa (N) (10)
Again, condition (10) is the same for all …rms and all workers. Therefore a
worker is again o¤ered the same type of compensation in all …rms.
There can be three kinds of equilibria. First, there are ‘full-attachment’
equilibria with » = 1: Second, there can be ´no-attachment’ equilibria with
» = 0. Third, there can be ’partial attachment’ equilibria with » = b» 2 (0; 1)
workers being attached.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium in the game with N local employers is as
follows.
1. The equilibrium without attachment always exists. There are no equi-
libria with either partial or full attachment if N ¸ N¤¤:
2. If (6) holds and N · N¤, partial attachment equilibrium with b» =
»¤(N) exists:
Again, attachment only occurs in the concentrated local labor markets.
The model may have multiple equilibria. If no worker is attached, attaching
an additional worker does not pay o¤: it will not su¢ce to create incen-
tives for keeping the assets. On the hand, if »¤(N) workers are attached,
liquidation may be avoided.
5.3 Appendix 3. List of Variables and Tables
1. Personal characteristics
² male (dummy, equals one if male)
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² married (dummy, equals one if the person is married)
² edyrs (years spent on education)
² age (age in years)
² i6adpdjb (has another job)
2. Life satisfaction
² wantmove (dummy, equals one if person wants to move in the
coming year)
² i6econrk (economic rank)
² i6satlif (life satisfaction)
3. Household characteristics
² hhincome (household income)
² aprent (dummy, equals one if the person rents his/her housing)
² hhsize (size of the household)
² nkids7 (number of children aged below 7 in the household)
² nkids7-18 (number of children aged 7-18 in the household)
² numwork (number of working adults in the household)
4. Job characteristics
² wgmln (the last monthly monetary wage in million rubles)
² jobsyr (number of years spent in the …rm)
² inkind (dummy, equals one if person received in-kind payments
in the last month)
² arr (dummy, equals one if person had wage arrears in the last
month)
² boss (has subordinates)
5. Geographical characteristics
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² PSU (primary sampling unit, 38 communities represented in the
sample)
² CR4 (labor market concentration ratio at the PSU level: the
share of four biggest employers in the total employment in the
PSU)
² region (regional dummies for eight regions: Moscow and StPeters-
berg, Central and Central Blacksoil region, North and North-
west, Volga, East Siberia and Far East, North Caucasus, Western
Siberia, Urals)
² mon2min (average per capita monetary income de‡ated by min-
imum living standard in the oblast, 1995)
² dep2min (average per capita savings de‡ated by minimum living
standard in the oblast, 1995)
6. Mobility characteristics
² move (dummy, equals one if person is not found in the same
community next year)
7. Community characteristics
² c6bank (availability of bank o¢ces)
² c6telphp (phone lines per 100 people)
² c6roads (quality of roads)
² c6electr (electricity)
² c6waters (water supply)
² pschool (availability of schools)
² phealth (availability of healthcare)
² garbg (availability of centralized garbage collection)
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Table A: Probit (dF/dx) estimations for Move
Move Spec.1 Spec.2 Spec.3 Spec.4 Spec.5 Spec.6
hhincome .021* .031*** .034*** .033*** .006* -.016
(.011) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.004) (.052)
jobsyr -.001* -.002** -.002** -.001 -.001** -.135**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.006)
edyrs .003 .006** .005** .005* .000 -.007
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.001) .15
age -.002*** -.002** -.002** -.002*** -.001*** -.003*
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) .002
male .061*** .058*** .058*** .058*** .011*** .101**
(.008) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.004) .044
married -.027 -.030* -.030* -.031* .004 -.008
(.018) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.006) (0.088)
aprent .374*** .255*** .248*** .317*** .297*** .477***
(.060) (.085) (.087) (.075) (.065) (.080)
nkids7-18 -.0115 -.016* -.016* -.014 .000 .021
(.010) (.009) (.009) (.010) (.004) .046
PSU dummies sign.
reg.dummies sign. sign. sign. sign. sign.
CR4 -.123*** -.121*** -.109** -.034** -.293**
(.043) (.046) (.047) (.014) (.120)
mon2min -.030
(.026)
c6bank .020 -.008 .214
(.045) (.014) .142
c6telphp -.001 -.000 -.003*
(.001) ( .000) .002
c6roads -.035** -.010 -.149**
(.016) (.007) .067
observations 3819 3819 3819 3252 2857 292
pseudo R2 .135 .082 .085 .102 .238 .183
*** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%; S.E.s in parentheses adj. for clustering at the PSU level
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Table B: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.dev. Min Max
move 4961 .17 .38 0 1
hhincome, def 5302 .46 .55 0 6.18
jobsyr 4101 8.62 8.67 1 44
edyrs 5288 12.19 2.78 0 27
age 5302 43.83 12.32 20 60
male 5302 .49 .49 0 1
married 5286 .72 .45 0 1
aprent 5285 .054 .23 0 1
nkids7-18 5302 .73 .88 0 7
CR4 5302 .59 .29 .07 1
inkind 4036 .084 .28 0 1
mon2min 5302 1.96 .96 1.1 5.49
c6bank 5119 1.06 .24 1 2
c6telphp 4489 35.99 22.91 .2 98
c6roads 5122 1.87 .66 1 4
wantmove 5302 .087 .28 0 1
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Table C: Probit (dF/dx) estimations for Inkind
Inkind Spec. 1 Spec. 2
hhincome .003 .000
(.009) (.012)
jobsyr -.000 -.000
(.000) (.000)
edyrs -.005*** -.004**
(.002) (.002)
age -.000 -.000
(.001) (.001)
male .016 .013
(.009) (.010)
married -.027 -.004
(.018) (.012)
aprent .003 .044**
(.010) (.024)
nkids7-18 -.015*** .016**
(.005) (.006)
regional dummies sign. sign.
CR4 .093** .064**
.029 (.032)
c6bank .037***
(.011)
c6telphp .009
.023
c6roads .000
.000
observations 3910 3318
pseudo R2 .062 .079
*** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%;
standard errors in parentheses,
adjusted for clustering at the PSU level
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